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I.   
                                        Introduction 
 
In a recent article, McKinnon (2004) brings attention to a little-known article 
by Mundell (1973b) that argues that optimal risk-sharing is attained when 
countries exhibit a wide degree of heterogeneity. This paper is indeed the 
major latest refinement, if not a correction of the Optimum Currency Area 
(OCA) theory, initiated by Mundell (1961) himself. Before this paper, 
Mundell argued that an economic area has to be optimal before using a 
common currency or a fixed exchange-rate mechanism. The causality is 
reversed in 1973 since using a common currency or joining a fixed 
exchange-rate mechanism may help an economic area become optimal. 
Thus, there is a chronological anteriority of what is Mundell’s intuition in 
1973 over what will become known as the Endogenous Optimum Currency 
Area theory (Frankel and Rose 1998). The goal of our paper is twofold. First, 
we want to provide an empirical assessment of Mundell’s intuition using the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an example. Second, we want to 
emphasize that Mundell’s intuition is already a good answer to what will 
become a debate on two definitions of economic convergence between 
Krugman (1993) on the one hand and the European Commission on the other 
hand (European Commission 1990). 
 
The paper McKinnon refers to was published in 1973 and is part of two 
prescient papers by Mundell (1973a) on the advantages of common 
currencies presented at a conference in Madrid in 1970 on optimum currency 
areas. According to McKinnon (2004), “Perhaps in part because the 
conference proceedings were not published until 1973, these papers have 
been overshadowed by his 1960s masterpieces.”  The economic literature 
seems to have forgotten the refinements and the new directions these two 
papers were giving to the brand new literature on optimal currency areas. 
McKinnon regrets: “The first of these papers ‘Uncommon Arguments for 
Common Currencies’ is of great intrinsic interest because very early on it 
emphasized the forward-looking nature of the foreign exchange market – 
which was then worked out in more analytical detail by his students: see, e.g. 
Frenkel and Mussa (1980).” In other words, it was already embodying the 
endogeneity of the optimality of a currency area. Already in 1973, Mundell 
has this intuition that will become a concept in 1998 with Frankel and Rose 
(1998). 
 
McKinnon notes that “As such, it counters the earlier Mundell idea that 
asymmetric shocks – i.e. those where an unexpected disturbance to national 
output affects one country differently from another – undermine the case for 
a common currency. Instead, Mundell II showed how having a common   4
currency across countries can mitigate such shocks by better reserve pooling 
and portfolio diversification. Under a common currency, a country suffering 
an adverse shock can better share the loss with a trading partner because both 
countries hold claims on each other’s output.” 
 
According to Mundell’s arguments, in the absence of capital controls, 
credibly fixed exchange rates would encourage international portfolio 
diversification to share the risks from asymmetric economic shocks 
(McKinnon 2004). This would, in turn, reduce asynchronous economic 
shocks helping the creation of an OCA, thus allowing the OCA to arise 
endogenously. Mundell’s intuition in 1973 over the causality of an OCA is 
based on allocation of capital. Later, Frankel and Rose (1998) and Frankel 
(1999) twig the concept of “endogenous” optimum currency area: “The OCA 
criterion might be satisfied ex post even if not ex ante” (Frankel 1999). They 
relate this endogeneity to trade integration and show that trade integration 
reduces the likelihood of asynchronous economic shocks (Frankel and Rose 
1998). McKinnon (2004): “The presence of asynchronous demand shocks, or 
asynchronous fluctuations more generally, could well diminish as trade 
integration increases. Of course, under a common currency, asynchronous 
demand shocks would quite minor because of the disappearance of separate 
national monetary policies.” 
 
In 2003, Ching and Devereux (2003) considers Mundell’s intuition in 1973 
to examine from a theoretical perspective the tradeoff between the 
adjustment benefits of a flexible exchange rate on the one hand, and the risk-
sharing benefits of a single currency area on the other hand as in Mundell 
(1973). Our study wants to bring empirical evidence to Mundell’s intuition 
and uses the EMU as an illustration. We examine to what extent the 
transition to the Euro endogenously affected the allocation of capital across 
the European Union. 
 
Europe designed institutions to assure economic convergence prior the 
introduction of the Euro abiding by a strict definition of the OCA theory. 
Initiated in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty set out strict guidelines for member 
states to follow with the ultimate goal of adopting a single currency. The 
adoption of the common currency in 1999 concluded the European 
convergence process. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty serves as the blueprint for the eventual adoption of a 
common currency and identifies several macroeconomic convergence 
policies to be satisfied by all candidate countries before entrance into the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). The treaty presents the following 
convergence criteria: 
   5
1.  candidate country inflation is no more than 1.5% above the average 
of the lowest three inflation rates in the European Monetary System 
(EMS);  
2.  the long-term interest rate of the candidate country is no more than 
2% higher than the average of the low inflation countries in the EMS;  
3.  the candidate country is a member of the exchange rate mechanism of 
the EMS and has not observed a devaluation in the two years 
preceding entrance into the EMU;  
4.  the candidate country government budget deficit is no higher than 3% 
of GDP; and  
5.  the candidate country government debt does not exceed 60% of GDP.  
 
Underlying the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria is the European 
Commission (1990)’s interpretation of the theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas first proposed by Mundell (1961a). As we shall see, the five economic 
criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht are one definition of convergence, and 
more precisely a macroeconomic definition of convergence. 
 
In order to address the positive or negative externalities of these criteria on 
the microeconomic level, this study proposes an empirical analysis of the 
endogenous OCA theory. The first originality of this study is to employ an 
alternative measure to bilateral trade flows. Indeed, we chose to go back to 
the first intuition of the endogenous OCA theory found in Mundell (1973b) 
when he refers to the allocation of capital as a result of the use of a common 
currency. For this purpose, we will use the bilateral foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows as a proxy for the allocation of capital as done in several papers 
(Razin et al. 2002). 
 
The second originality is in the combination of this micro-approach 
(Hecksher-Ohlin variables) with the convergence measure (European 
macroeconomic aggregates). This approach is inspired by Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2002) who developed a theoretical model dealing with the micro-
structure of national economies instead of bilateral trade: imperfect 
competition, nominal rigidities in the goods markets, and forward-looking 
price-setting by firms.  
 
We employ these microeconomic measures through an empirical analysis 
using a variation of the gravity model of international trade. Generalized, the 
gravity model explains a flow from country i to country j by economic forces 
at the flow’s origin, the economic forces at the flows destination, and the 
forces aiding or resisting the movement of the flow from the origin to the 
destination.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents background 
discussion of the endogeneity argument with respect to European integration.   6
Section 3 presents the methodology of the gravity model used in this study 
and its connection to multinational firm theory. Section 4 follows with a 
discussion of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 provides some 






The political discussions of the late 1970s following the inception of the 
ECU (European Currency Unit) focused on the likelihood of transforming 
this complementary currency to existing currencies into a perfect substitute 
to the same existing currencies. 
 
2.1 To the origins of the OCA theory 
 
The OCA theory, first introduced by Mundell (1961) served to frame both 
the costs and benefits of monetary integration within this political discussion. 
Since then a vast literature has developed with notable contributions by 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). According to Frankel and Rose (1998), 
this literature focuses on four inter-relationships between the members of a 
potential OCA: (1) the extent of trade; (2) the similarity of shocks and 
cycles; (3) the degree of labor mobility; and (4) the system of risk-sharing, 
usually through fiscal transfers. 
 
Given the obvious applicability of this theory to European integration, the 
European Commission (1990) started to work on the steps necessary to enter 
into an OCA. However, according to Eichengreen (1990), Europe at the time 
was clearly not an OCA. Consequently, the Treaty of Maastricht was 
implemented in 1993 in order to force convergence to an OCA prior to 
adoption of a common currency. Five economic proxies were devised to 
ensure the convergence on the three public policy dimensions: (1) monetary 
policy (in a closed and open economy perspective); (2) fiscal policy; and (3) 
structural policy. The proxies were respectively: inflation, exchange rate, 
national debt, public deficit, and long-term interest rates. 
 
2.2 The Endogenous OCA Theory: Mundell’s intuition 
 
Although Europe was arguably not an OCA before the inception of the Euro 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, 1994, 1996), economic literature started to 
develop an e-OCA theory (to copy molecular scientists who created the Oca-
B) known as the endogenous optimum currency area theory. According to 
Frankel and Rose (1998), the “examination of historical data gives a 
misleading picture of a country’s suitability for entry into a currency union, 
since the OCA criteria are endogenous.” In other words, waiting for two   7
economies to be in phase before adopting the same currency is only one part 
of the path towards an OCA since using a common currency will also force 
the economies to become an OCA.  
 
We can already find a similar argument in Mundell (1973a,b): if countries 
adopt a common currency without substantial changes to their purchasing 
parities, and thereby eliminate uncertainty in the exchange rate, then they 
gain a better allocation of capital. Although this is not yet the endogenous 
OCA (since Mundell argues that purchasing parities should demonstrate 
some steadiness over time), he nevertheless emphasizes that gains in terms of 
allocation of capital are necessary to help create an OCA.  
 
We can also find the e-OCA already in the European Commission (1990)’s 
report stating that the EMU will reduce the incidence of country-specific 
shocks. 
 
2.3 Concerns about convergence: Frankel and Rose’s response 
 
The OCA definition is not related to convergence in business cycles. When 
policymakers talk about the convergence needed to become an OCA, 
attention should be paid to the type of convergence being considered. In 
separating convergence in trade from convergence in business cycles, 
Krugman (1993) argues that specialization will occur in Europe due to the 
reduction of transaction costs, which is opposed to the European 
Commission (1990)’s report.
1 Mundell’s (1961) article is the theoretical 
basis for the European Commission. Indeed, “This article leans towards 
making currency areas smaller and more homogenous – rather than larger 
and more heterogenous” notes McKinnon (2004). As Kenen (1969) pointed 
out, relatively undiversified, less developed countries, should retain 
exchange flexibility, and only diversified economies should join a fixed 
exchange-rate regime, such as Bretton Woods at the time of writing of the 
chapter. Kenen’s conclusion is in line with Mundell (1961a), but not with 
Mundell (1973b) where Mundell emphasizes the need to promote asset 
diversification for international risk-sharing. This can also be said for 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Krugman (1993) who worried that 
“even a successful monetary and economic union may become less of an 
optimum currency area over time as its regions naturally become more 
specialized in what they produce” (McKinnon 2004). According to 
McKinnon (2004), Kenen’s point that undiversified countries retain 
exchange rate flexibility in order to ameliorate the resulting income 
fluctuations does not hold. Indeed, “tying the exchange rate to the fortunes of 
one or two primary products undermines private portfolio diversification and 
international risk-sharing”. Moreover, “once risk-sharing through portfolio 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed presentation of the debate, see De Grauwe (2003).   8
diversification in bond holding is properly weighed, the case for a monetary 
union becomes even stronger as the constituent parts of the underlying 
economic union become more specialized in what they produce. Presumably, 
the productivity from greater regional specialization is one of the major 
benefits of having an economic cum monetary union in the first place!” 
(McKinnon 2004). 
 
Further research like Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999) show using bilateral 
EU trade during 1980-1994 that the EMU is likely to foster intra-industry 
trade in Europe, leading to more symmetric shocks between member states. 
In other words, the monetary union will endogenously create the conditions 
of its success. 
 
According to Frankel and Rose (1998), endogeneity comes from the fact that 
“Entry into a currency union may raise international trade linkages … more 
importantly, tighter international trade ties can be expected to affect the 
nature of national business cycles.” Further studies, for example Devereux 
and Engel (2002) or Broda and Romalis (2003), have developed empirical 
analyses of the e-OCA using trade and exchange rate models. The roots of 
these studies are in the examination of the two-way interaction between trade 
pricing and exchange rate volatility proposed by Baldwin and Lyons (1993, 
1994). 
 
Another noteworthy point in Frankel and Rose (1998) is the difference 
between trade and business cycles: “From a theoretical viewpoint, closer 
international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of 
national business cycles. Cycles could, in principle, become more 
idiosyncratic. Closer trade ties could result in countries becoming more 
specialized in the goods in which they have comparative advantage. These 
countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting 
in more idiosyncratic business cycles. However, if demand shocks (or other 
common shocks) predominate, or if intra-industry trade accounts for most 
trade, then business cycles may become more similar across countries when 
countries trade more.” 
 
For this study, we propose an empirical analysis of the e-OCA through the 
use of a different proxy than the bilateral trade used by Frankel and Rose 
(1998): the bilateral FDI flows. By doing so, we want to measure Mundell 
(1973b)’s intuition about the better allocation of capital that would result 
from the use of a common currency. We use FDI flows as a proxy for the 
allocation of capital (Razin et al. 2002), and – as in Mundell (1973b)’s 
argument – we will consider the exchange rates among other variables. This 
model conforms to the micro-structure approach by Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2002), as well as De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005)’s “intuition” about the 




Methodology and data 
 
We will use a gravity model to analyze bilateral FDI outflows. This model is 
commonly employed in the study of international trade. FDI is the movement 
of production activity across the national border. More specifically, FDI is 
the acquisition of 10% or more of foreign firm assets. According to Feenstra 
(1999), this internal activity is significantly different from inter-firm linkages 
that can be established when independent firms interact. The acquisition of a 
foreign subsidiary for production or branch distribution includes benefits 
such as lower trade costs and information costs. Barrel and Pain (1997) argue 
that FDI is not simply an alternative method to increase firm production 
capacity, but becomes a channel for the transfer of knowledge capital and 
transaction technology.  
 
Multinational activity is usually described with reference to ownership-
specific advantages, internalization incentives, and location-specific 
advantages outlined in Dunning (1981). Ownership-specific advantages refer 
to a firm’s propriety rights or exclusive or favorable access to inputs and 
factors of production. Internalization incentives include legal safeguards 
such as absence of price discrimination, institutions that protect property 
rights, and protection against exploitation through government intervention 
(e.g., tariffs, tax differences, and quotas) to protect the firm. Location-
specific advantages, the focus of this study, assume firm profitability in 
producing a product in a foreign country rather than simply producing it at 
home and exporting to the foreign market. Transport and communications 
costs are the most obvious examples. Others include input prices, quality and 
productivity of labor, energy, materials, and intermediate goods as well as 
the distribution of inputs and markets in the production process of firm 
operation in the foreign country.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, location advantages can be divided into two 
competing arguments. The factor proportions hypothesis, presented in 
Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), and Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
states that multinational activity arises only in the presence of sufficient 
differences in factor endowments among countries. When these differences 
in factor prices are equalized across borders, no incentives exist for the firm 
to maintain a foreign center of production. It should be noted that an 
important limitation to this strand of literature was the assumption of zero 
transportation costs.  
 
The second argument, known as the proximity-concentration hypothesis 
(Brainard 1997) arose largely as a consequence of the work of Krugman   10
(1991) on positive transportation costs. Brainard (1997) combined positive 
trade costs with the Markusen (1984) framework of symmetric factor 
endowments through a trade-off between multinational firm proximity to a 
destination market and advantages in maintaining plant production abroad to 
supply the destination market. The absence of factor price differentials forces 
firms to consider the additional fixed cost of a production plant abroad 
versus the additional variable cost of continued exports to supply the foreign 
market.  
 
An extended model, presented in Markusen and Venables (1998) and 
Markusen and Venables (2000) incorporated Brainard’s positive 
transportation costs, but also allowed for asymmetries between countries due 
to country size, factor endowments, and technology. Horizontal expansion by 
multinational firms is driven by an overall large market, and similarities in 
relative market size, similar labor costs, and high transportation costs and 
tariffs. 
 
According to the convergence criteria, the integration process is focused on 
inflation, budgetary, exchange rate, and interest rate convergence. These 
criteria account for every aspect necessary for monetary, fiscal, and 
structural stability, yet the effect of these measures on bilateral foreign 
investment – largely a microeconomic phenomenon – has not been the focus 
of past empirical research. The following section presents the model used in 
this empirical analysis and application of the convergence criteria into an 
econometric framework. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a variant of the gravity model, commonly 
used to analyze bilateral trade flows.
2 The dataset is composed of aggregate 
annual bilateral flows of foreign direct investment between EU-15 members 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom) from the OECD and are expressed in million euros. There are N = 
14 × 13 = 182 bilateral relations per time period (i.e., aggregated cross-
                                                 
2 The model was first independently derived by Tinbergen, J. (1962) Shaping the world 
economy; suggestions for an international economic policy, New York,: Twentieth 
Century Fund., and Poyhonen, P. (1963) 'A Tentative Model for the Volume of Trade 
Between Countries', Welwirtschaftliches Archiv 90: 93-99.. For a theoretical background, 
see Deardorff, A. V. and National Bureau of Economic Research. (1995) Determinants 
of bilateral trade : does gravity work in a neoclassical world?, Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.. Please see Egger, P. and Pfaffermayr, M. 
(2004) 'Foreign Direct Investment and European Integration in the 1990s', The World 
Economy 27: 99-110. for an excellent overview of different estimation techniques that 
are routinely employed for the gravity models.   11
sections).
3 The data cover the period from 1994 to 2005, yielding a total 
sample of n=182×7=2184 bilateral observations. Since the dataset includes a 
few missing observations, the actual dataset is smaller and unbalanced.
4
 
The model is estimated using the following gravity equation and includes 
Hecksher-Ohlin variables (market size, income similarity, factor 
endowments, and distance) as well as proxies for capturing the European 
convergence (interest rate difference, budget difference, and debt difference):  
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Where bilateral country pairs are denoted ij= Austria-Belgium, Austria-
Denmark,…, UK-Sweden [168], and time t=1994, 1995,…,2005 [7]. 
EMU is a dummy variable that takes a value of zero for every year when 
both countries in a pair are not EMU members, and one from when both 
countries in the pair are EMU members. For pairs with countries that are not 
yet EMU members the value will be zero for the whole sample. This 
approach will make us able to use these pairs as a de facto control group, an 
approach that will be reinforced by the interaction variables. Indeed, 
moreover we interact this dummy variable with the variables representing 
market size, market similarity, factor endowments, distance, interest rate, 
differences in budget deficits, and differences in public debts. This helps us 
isolate whether being an EMU member matters or not compared to not being 
a member, while using the exogenous variables we specified. 
 
The explanatory variables take the following forms:  
 
 
3 For the empirical study, Belgium and Luxembourg are combined yielding 14 member 
states. The number of bilateral trading partners is always one less than the number of 
member states because domestic investment is not considered. 
4 Note that 14 cross-sections are missing in the dataset. The majority of these bilateral flows 
originate from Finland or Ireland, or are destined to Greece. Therefore, N=168, and 
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This model with interaction terms is developed to test for a structural shift in 
the FDI as a result of a country’s entry into the Euro zone
5. 
 
Expected signs are given above the respective coefficient.
6 Note that the 
dependent variable FDI represents the flow value rather than stock 
measurement more commonly used in empirical analysis.
7 In this case, FDI 
flows capture the creation of new linkages between multinational firms and 
foreign affiliates.
8 Fixed effects are denoted αs, and recognize country-
specific (symmetric) heterogeneity, but homogeneity when I = j (i.e. when I 
=Austria or j =Austria, then the dummy variable takes a value of 1, and zero 
otherwise). Therefore, heterogeneity models country-specific participation or 
investment intensity instead of modeling heterogeneity between source and 
host countries.
9 The error term, εij,t, represents all unobserved bilateral 
                                                 
5 The convergence period started in 1993 and finished in 1998. We start in 1994, however 
not using 1993 should not be an issue, since the relevant years for the entry into the 
EMU were 1997 and 1998. 
6 An exchange rate variable and an absolute inflation rate variable were included in the 
initial analysis to account for all Maastricht Treaty criteria. Both variables yielded 
statistically insignificant results and were excluded from the final model.  
7 See Brenton, P., Di Mauro, F. and Lucke, M. (1999) 'Economic Integration and FDI: An 
Empirical Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment in the EU and Central and Eastern 
Europe', Empirica 26: 95-121., and Egger, P. and Pfaffermayr, M. (2004) 'Foreign Direct 
Investment and European Integration in the 1990s', The World Economy 27: 99-110. for 
empirical research employing FDI stock values. 
8 The dependent variable for FDI is in log form, reflecting only positive investment;  
  disinvestment is recorded as 0. A value of 1 is added to each FDI value to avoid . 
This does not bias the estimates as 
() 0 ln
( ) ( ) t ij t ij FDI FDI , , ln 1 ln ≈ +  when   is large. 
But, where 
, ij t FDI
( ) 0 ln , = t ij FDI , then  ( ) 0 1 ln , = + t ij FDI . 
9 For a generalized fixed effects gravity model, see Baltagi, B. H., Egger, P. and 
Pfaffermayr, M. (2003) 'A Generalized Design for Bilateral Trade Flow Models', Economics 
Letters 80(3): 391-397..   13
effects. The three Hecksher-Ohlin variables (G, S, R) resemble the Helpman 
(1987) specification and are detailed below. 
 
G is the measure of “market size” (see table 1) or overall “economic space”. 
Therefore, it serves as a proxy for investment that is motivated by market-
expansion reasons (Helpman 1987). The expected value is positive for 
investment flows under circumstances of horizontal firm integration. 
 
S is an index that captures the relative size of the two economies that is 
bounded between absolute divergence in size and equality in country size, 
called “market similarity” (see table 1). If two countries have roughly equal 
GDP, the coefficient approaches  ( ) 5 . 0 ln 69 . 0 = − . Perfect dissimilarity yields 
a coefficient value that approaches  ( ) 0 ln .
10 A positive coefficient is evidence 
of horizontal firm integration, as presented by Brainard (1997) and Markusen 
and Venables (1998). Similarity in country size is one of the main theoretical 
determinants of multinational expansion to determine market similarity. 
 
R measures the relative difference between the two countries in terms of 
relative “factor endowments” (see table 1). R in this study is the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation and country population. The factor endowments 
variable takes a minimum value of 0, representing equality in relative factor 
endowments, and a maximum value that approaches 1, the largest possible 
difference in relative factor endowments. As mentioned in the preceding 
section, the importance of factor endowments varies significantly depending 
on the trade theory hypothesis examined. Horizontal firm integration theory 
dictates that factor endowment differences are irrelevant and should not be 
significant (or even exist) among developed countries. As the EU represents 
a set of well-developed and relatively wealthy countries, movement toward 
equalization of relative factor endowments is expected to yield an increase in 
bilateral FDI outflows. 
 
D denotes the log of the “distance” (see table 1) between the economic 
centers of the two countries. Broadly speaking, distance is a proxy for trade 
and transportation costs, which has a negative impact on investment and 
trade flows. Markusen and Venables (2000) argue that distance is not 
relevant, but transportation costs are important for entry of multinational 
firms. Investment that promotes production for the foreign market a priori 
should not be greatly influenced by distance. Yet, if distance and 
transportation costs are inextricably linked, the coefficient on D should be 
                                                 
10 In the case of a country pair approaching perfect dissimilarity, the coefficient approaches -
∞.   14
negative. The costs associated with distance, such as communication and 
coordination costs, reduce incentives to new investment.
11
 
IRDIF is the difference in “interest rates” (see table 1) between country I and 
j. The interest rate measures the long-term cost of borrowing. A negative 
coefficient is expected. Financing of assets and affiliate purchases is likely to 
come from both the source or target country; convergence in rates of both 
markets would see an increase in investor confidence and positive FDI flows. 
In other words, convergence could likely result in tight correlation of the 
interest rates. 
 
BGTDIF represents the difference in the government “budget surplus or 
deficit”  as a percentage of GDP (see table 1) between the source and host 
country. A convergence in the balance of the budget surplus is expected to 
increase investment. The intuition behind the expectation is clear: the 
variable attempts to capture the effect of government fiscal responsibility. 
Presumably, a multinational firm wishing to expand horizontally will be 
induced to invest in a market characterized by a similarity in government 
finances relative to the source country. 
 
DBTDIF is the difference of the “debt-to-GDP ratio” between each country 
pair (see table 1). This variable represents long-term stability of the 
government. Since FDI is considered a long-term transaction (as compared 
to exports, for example), a reduction in the debt differential between 
countries is likely to lead to an increase in investment flows. 
 
Given the longitudinal nature of data, a simple OLS estimate of our model 
imposes strict restrictions that might not be justifiable given the complicated 
nature of our dataset. Specifically, we expect both temporally dependent 
interactions as well as interactions between country panels that contradict 
OLS assumptions. The presence of serial correlation and panel 
heteroscedasticity were of key concern in our estimation of this the model. 
 
A way to check for autocorrelation is to use Baltagi and Wu (1999)’s LBI 
test or a modified Durbin-Watson test for unequally spaced panel data 
(Bhargava et al. 1982). If there is autocorrelation, the option would be 
fourfold: (1) a dynamic panel model (two-way random effect model or error-
component model) with first differences, sometimes known as a Prais-
                                                 
11 It is worthwhile to point out that if horizontal FDI is aimed as a substitute for exports due 
in part by higher transportation costs, then the expected value should be positive. This 
argument is in line with theory presented in Markusen, J. R. and Venables, A. (1998) 
'Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory', Journal of International Economics 46: 
183-203.. This study does not look at lower FDI transportation costs relative to bilateral 
trade transportation costs; instead, the variable is focused on measuring significance of 
absolute barriers to investment.   15
Winston transformation or a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation; (2) a dynamic 
model with lagged dependent variables with two slightly different 
approaches known as one or two step general methods of moments (GMM) 
estimators as in Arellano and Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995)
12; 
(3) a weight-adjusted combination of the White and Newey-West estimator 
to handle both the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation in the model; or 
(4) a feasible generalized least squares procedure (FGLS, or a two-state 
generalized least squares model) as in Parks (1967) and Kmenta (1997) in 
which the model assumes an autoregressive error structure of the first order 
AR(1), along with contemporaneous correlation among cross-sections. 
 
The initial set of OLS estimates was subject to several tests to determine the 
interaction between observations. The assumption of zero autocorrelation 
was rejected by the Baltagi and Wu (1999)’s LBI test, while the modified 
Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson proved inconclusive for positive 
serial correlation. Therefore the fourth option above was chosen. The model 
was estimated using the cross-sectionally heteroscedastic and time-wise 
autoregressive model (Kmenta 1997). Unlike pooled OLS estimation, the 
Kmenta-Parks method employed here accounts for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation when present.
13  
 
The Kmenta-Parks model is slightly modified. When T<N (here T=12 and 
N=168) the following assumption is necessary: ( ) 0 , , , = t ji t ij E ε ε , thereby 
removing the assumption of contemporaneous correlation among cross-
sections.  
 
While our choice of estimation method is not immune to criticism, such as 
those found in Beck and Katz (1995), the modified FGLS estimates here 
perform best because of our concern for autocorrelation. One of the main 
                                                 
12 GMM is usually robust to deviations of the underlying data generation process to 
violations of heteroskedasticity and normality, insofar as they are asymptotically normal, 
but they are not always the most efficient estimators. 
13 First, OLS is used to obtain the regression residuals, which are then used to obtain   a 
transformation that has an asymptotically non-autoregressive and homoscedastic error 
term. The other characteristics if the general Kmenta-Parks model are as follows: 
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criticisms of the Kmenta-Parks estimates is the possibility of underestimation 
of standard errors and consequently resulting in an artificially inflated 
statistical significance. Since the FGLS method could be employed either in 
a fixed effects or random effects framework depending up on the underlying 
behavior of cross-sectional heterogeneity, it is critical that an appropriate test 
be conducted before proceeding with the suitable estimation strategy.
14    
 
Lastly, we detail the data sources of the variables. FDI outflow data are from 
the OECD. The flow of FDI is cross-border investment in which the investor 
has a long-term interest in an enterprise or market in another economy. 
Investment is composed of two parts: equity capital and other capital. Equity 
capital includes all branches and ordinary shares in subsidiaries and 
associates. Other capital is comprised of inter-company debt, such as loans 
and trade credits, between the investor and the subsidiary (branch or 
associate). Data are weighted with 2000 as the base year by the CPI provided 
by Ameco (European Commission). 
 
GDP data are taken from Ameco (European Commission) and expressed in 
million euros using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates. Data are also 
converted to a 2000 base year through the CPI provided by Ameco. The total 
labor force (used in the capital per worker ratio) is defined as the 
economically active population that contributes to the production of goods 
and services in the formal economy. The variable was obtained from the 
World Bank.  
 
Distance data were obtained from Jon Haveman’s Website.
15 The variable is 
defined as the distance between the economic center of one country to 
another. Note that this does not lead to a value of 0 when countries are 
adjacent to each other. In the empirical study, we loosely follow Polak 
(1996) who addresses the built-in bias of the gravity model that is 
                                                 
14  According to the Hausman specification test, the cross-sectional heterogeneity can be 
treated as random, if the null hypothesis  ( ) 0 , : H , , 0 = ′
t ij t ij E ε Z can not be rejected, 
signifying a lack of correlation between the explanatory variables and the disturbance 
term. However, with   which is significant at < .01 level, the stated null 
hypothesis could be rejected, signifying correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the disturbance term. Accordingly, a fixed effects model is preferred. The reported 
test statistic is based on our sample employed in Table 1 empirical analysis. This finding 
is in accordance with Egger, P. and Pfaffermayr, M. (2004) 'Foreign Direct Investment 
and European Integration in the 1990s', The World Economy 27: 99-110.. Specifically, 
the cross-sectional heterogeneity dimension is captured by employing 13 symmetric 
dummies given a total of 14 countries included in the sample. As suggested by Greene, 
W. H. (2003) Econometric analysis, Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall., a 
maximum likelihood estimation method is employed for obtaining the FGLS estimates 
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“downward” for “far-away countries” and “upward” for “close-up 
countries.” The solution is to make the distance variable relative to the size 
of the host country economy. The variable therefore, is weighted by the host 
country population.  
 
Interest rates represent central government bond yields on the secondary 
market with a residual maturity of 10 years (Eurostat). Budget 
surplus/deficits as a percentage of a country’s GDP were obtained from 
Eurostat. The budget of the consolidated central government includes 
operations of budgetary central government, extra budgetary units, and social 
security funds. Debt data are compiled by Eurostat. Debt is defined as 
consolidated gross debt of the central government and sub sectors including 
state government, local government, and social security debt. The 




Interpretation of the results 
 
We propose to look at the results through two steps: the European 
convergence variables and interaction variables, and the country fixed 
effects. 
   18
Variable Std. Dev. Coefficient z-value
13.870970 0.748909 4.314855 8.42***
-1.196138 0.475701 2.226209 8.23***
0.293574 0.217749 -0.549432 -2.15**
D (Distance) 4.166783 1.348870 -0.374466 -6.25***
0.703530 1.204998 0.043582 1.37
2.541130 1.866821 0.006072 0.31
22.312020
EMU dummy 0.333628 0.471717 -6.075481 -2.28**
Interaction variables
G*EMU 4.651068 6.588521 0.400897 2.27**
S*EMU -0.390779 0.611815 0.578531 3.04**
R*EMU 0.089800 0.171809 0.092518 0.21
D*EMU 1.382250 2.109920 0.272843 3.30***
IRDIF*EMU 0.036540 0.073691 1.114270 2.6***
BGTDIF*EMU 0.946514 1.816619 -0.073306 -2.72***
DBTDIF*EMU 8.975993 18.309360 0.006400 2.34*
0.165049 0.371388 1.826345 3.47***
0.070609 0.256284 4.394779 9.62***
0.148279 0.355533 4.320902 7.00***
0.082966 0.275952 3.323161 4.95***
0.179170 0.383664 -0.116105 -0.97
0.178288 0.382924 -0.238437 -1.81*
0.063548 0.244054 1.600035 2.82***
0.096205 0.295002 5.818056 8.08***
0.182701 0.386592 -0.788204 -5.24***
0.172992 0.378407 2.997415 8.34***
0.177405 0.382180 2.031531 3.38***
0.173875 0.379169 0.310433 1.45
0.138570 0.345650 4.070427 7.83***
-53.272140 -7.16***
*    <.1 significance    
**    <.05 significance    
*** <.01 significance   
Constant
























Table 1: FGLS Estimates 1994-2005 [Double-Log Specification]
Dependent Variable:
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4.1 European Convergence Variables 
 
Being an EMU member more specifically means that these countries 
converge. The European convergence seen through the usage of the common 
currency matters: once a country enters into the Euro zone, market size of the 
two countries, market similarity, and distance are significant. In other words, 
a converging Europe measured through the use of the Euro reinforces the 
attractiveness of the Euro zone in terms of FDI. Convergence occurs at 
different levels: at the structural policy level, and at the fiscal level. 
 
Our results suggest that a convergence in the long-term interest rate in the 
source and host countries does not affect multinational firms for the overall 
sample (see table 1). However, convergence in terms of interest rate leads to 
lower FDI flows for the EMU mmbers after 1999 (or at the date of their 
entry). Indeed, convergence in the long-term interest rate is a sign of a 
convergence in the structural policies among the EMU countries. In this 
case, this result suggests that the structural similarity of the countries reduces 
the interest to invest in these countries. 
 
However, there is also a “reassuring” effect of a European convergence when 
it comes to the fiscal policy. Management of government debt is determinant 
of FDI flows for the overall sample: convergence in public debts is 
significant and negative. Convergence in public debts seems to slightly 
reassure the investors of a sound situation by raising FDI attractiveness. This 
‘reassuring’ effect is reinforced by the results based on the interaction 
variables (see equation (3)): once in the Euro zone, FDI seem to flow 
between EMU countries with a greater difference in debt levels, while 
market size is still significant, as well as market similarity. This change in 
sign for the debt variable may find its explanation into the study of deficits. 
Within the Euro zone, convergence in public deficits are now significant. 
Convergence in public deficits – constrained by the Stability and Growth 
Pact – leads to a rise in FDI. Investors indeed seem to be reassured by the 
homogenization of fiscal policies. 
 
From equation (1), the EMU effect can be obtained by partially 
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This equation leads to: 
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   (4) 








This result suggests that belonging to the EMU has a strong effect on FDI 
from EMU countries to other EMU countries. Our estimation suggests that 
FDI flows double in this context (an increase of 102%).
16 This number is 
interesting to consider in line with the results found by Frankel and Rose 
(2002) who suggest that trade has tripled among currency union members. 
When it comes to FDI, we show with our interaction model that Mundell’s 
intuition was right, as well as provide an empirical assessment to De Grauwe 
and Mongelli (2005)’s “intuition” about the rise of FDI in Europe when 
countries belong to the EMU. 
 
Another interesting point is distance. Distance for countries within the Euro 
zone play an interesting role here: the farther the host EMU country the 
better. So this result suggests that within the Euro zone, investors seem to be 
reassured by the adhesion to the EMU and care less about proximity (see 
Figure 1). Indeed, one could note from our results that the interaction 
between distance and the EMU dummy (D*EMU) is positive (.272843 with 
a significant z-value) even though the overall effect is still negative (-
.374466 + .272843 = -.101623). In other words, the ‘gravity’ feature is still 
there: proximity in the overall sample matters displaying gravity, but once in 
the Euro zone ‘anti-gravity’ forces appear. This result is reinforced by the 
fact that eventually convergence in factor endowments do not seem to matter 
anymore once in the Euro zone. 
 
                                                 
16  (i.e., 102.891%). Given the log-lin nature of the empirical 
model, the coefficients scaled as 
()
0.7075 1 1.02891 e −=
( ) 1 e
β −  could be interpreted as partial elasticities (i.e., 
a resulting percentage change in FDI flows when all countries – sources and hosts – are 
EMU members).   21
EMU
 
Figure 1. Gravity and anti-gravity 
 
 
4.2 Country Fixed Effects 
 
Lastly, we briefly mention the symmetric country dummy variables that 
proxy country participation (both inflow and outflow) of FDI within the 
region. Interestingly, the most active countries in terms of multinational 
investment during the period observed have been Ireland, 
Belgium/Luxembourg, and Denmark for the overall period (see table 1). 
These findings are plausible as, comparatively speaking; the home markets 
of these countries are small relative to those of the region’s larger 
economies. Consequently, multinational firms based in those countries 





Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
The primary results of this empirical analysis find evidence of growing 
horizontal integration of the EU-15 based predominantly on market access 
and consumer income. These intra-industry linkages are the main factors that 
deepen market integration and allow for synchronization of demand and 
trade-based shocks. The magnitude of the Hecksher-Ohlin variables, 
specifically market size and income similarity, allows for a more visible role 
in determining the creation of horizontal linkages. Europe is indeed 
becoming an optimum currency area in terms of allocation of capital as 
formulated in Mundell (1973). 
 
Defined in terms of allocation of capital, convergence thus seems to have 
occurred. This supports the European Commission (1990)’s view, instead of 
Krugman (1993)’s comparative argument. 
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The convergence process of the European member states in the 1990s 
presents several factors that will guide the future entry of member countries 
into the monetary union. In May 2004, the European Union expanded to 
include ten Central and Eastern European accession candidates. The findings 
here suggest key characteristics that are necessary to attract intra-EU 
multinational investment during their accession into the EMU.  
 
Recent studies by Brenton et al. (1999) and Janicki and Wunnava (2004) 
show that trade between the European Union and these accession candidates 
is still based primarily on differences in factor endowments – such as labor 
costs – where production is aimed at re-export back to the EU market, rather 
than consumption in the candidate countries. Brenton et al. (1999) refer to 
this as the integration of the accession candidates into the European 
production process. The results presented here, however, suggest that the 
structure of current EU production process is quite different. The entry of the 
accession candidates into the EMU will depend not on the timetable 
presented by the European Commission; entry will depend on the 
development of intra-industry linkages and the continued creation of 
horizontal intensity of investment. 
 
Future empirical research could be useful in further exploring the 
convergence hypothesis presented in Markusen and Venables (1996). 
Specifically, the results here follow the hypothesis suggesting growth in 
multinational firms is determined by convergence of income levels, relative 
factor endowments, and size. A future analysis of intra- European imports 
and exports in modeling domestic firm behavior might be useful in finding 
further support of European convergence relative to growth in multinational 
firm activity. 
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